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T A L  S C R I V E N  
P L A T O ' S  " D E M O C R A T I C  M A N "  
A N D  T H E  I M P L A U S I B I L I T Y  O F  
P R E F E R E N C E  U T I L I T A R I A N I S M  
For some time J. C. Harsanyi has defended a theory called "preference 
utilitarianism". He poses his theory, against the classical hedonistic 
utilitarianism of  Bentham and the ideal utilitarianism of Moore which, 
he claims, face the following objections: 
The hedonistic definition was based on a now completely obsolete hedonistic psychology, 
which assumed that human actions were always motivated by seeking pleasure and avoiding 
pain, as if people could not be motivated by a desire for money, social status, success, 
knowledge, or by a genuine concern for the interests of other people regardless of the 
possible IAeasures they may or may not expect to derive from attainment of their objectives. 
On the other hand, Moore's ideal utilitarianism assumed that "mental states of intrinsic 
wor th"  differed from other mental states in having some special "nonnatural  qualities" 
a metaphysical theory most of us find hard to accept (and would find even harder to 
support by credible arguments even if we were willing to accept it)? 
Preference utilitarianism avoids this problem by allowing agents to deter- 
mine their own "fundamental  values" which may be rad:,cally different 
than the fundamental values of  Bentham and Moore. What Harsanyi 
insists upon is " the  familiar principle o f  consumers" sovereignty" which 
holds that the "interests of each individual must be defined fundamental- 
ly in terms of  his own personal preferences and not in terms of what 
somebody else thinks is 'good for him' ,,.2 Correction of  preferences 
which are based on factual misinformation or on miscalculation is allow- 
able, according to Harsanyi, but for an individual i to censor the prefer- 
ences of  j "because j ' s  preferences conflict with i's own fundamental  
value judgements"  and i "could not satisfy j ' s  preferences 'with good 
c o n s c i e n c e '  is w r o n g .  3 
Two problems surface immediately for this theory. First of  all, how far 
may we go in allowing various "fundamental  values" to count as legiti- 
mate values for rational people to pursue? Do we allow malice or sadism 
to be legitimate fundamental values to count as equals with benevolence 
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or knowledge for its own sake? Harsanyi ' s  mechanism for eliminating 
malice, sadism and the like is profoundly unsatisfactory. He simply 
claims that where preferences "a re  based on clearly antisocial attitudes, 
e.g., on sheer hostility, malice, envy and sadism" the preferences can be 
"censored" .  4 The problem with this line is pretty transparent.  It simply 
begs all the central questions of  ethics. I f  we can determine in advance 
which preferences are "soc ia l"  and which are "ant isocia l"  what do we 
need preference utilitarianism or any other ethical theory for? We would 
know what the theory was going to prescribe before we applied it. 
The second immediate problem with preference utilitarianism, howev- 
er, is the concern of this paper. It is a problem anticipated in Book VIII  
of  Pla to 's  Republic. Having seen the lack of any clear vision of the Good 
as a central characteristic of  democracy, he offers the following im- 
pression of the "democrat ic  m a n " :  
He does not welcome true reasoning or allow it into the guardhouse;  if someone tells him 
that some pleasures belong to good and beautiful desires, but others belong ,to evil ones, 
that one should prize and pursue the former while the latter must  be restrained and mastered, 
he denies all this and declares that all pleasures are equal and must  be equally prized. . .  
And he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand.  At one time he drinks heavily 
to the accompaniment  of  the flute, at another he drinks only water and is wasting away; 
at one time he goes in for physical exercise, then again he does nothing and cares for nothing; 
at times he pretends to spend his time on philosophy; often he takes part in public affairs; 
he then leaps up from his seat and says and does whatever comes into his mind; if he happens 
to admire military men,  he is carried in that direction, if moneyed men, he turns to making 
money; there is no plan or discipline in his life but  he calls it pleasant, free, and blessed, 
and he follows it throughout  his time. 5 
This impression of the democratic man brings us to a troublesome 
question about  the preference utilitarian. Given even that certain funda- 
mental values could satisfactorily be eliminated as "ant isocia l" ,  many 
legitimate fundamental  values would remain and one's  preferences over 
specific alternatives at specific times could vary radically as one's  fun- 
damental  values change over time. The question is, how often can one 
change one's mind about  fundamental  values and still remain rational in 
any straightforward sense? To require that any rational person never 
change his mind about fundamental  values is, pretty clearly, to require 
far too much. At the other extreme, to allow one to change fundamental  
values every ten minutes is, pretty clearly, to require far too little of  a 
rational individual. But at what point in between does it make any sense 
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P L A T O ' S  " D E M O C R A T I C  M A N "   
at all to mark out a minimum and a maximum number of times a rational 
person could change his mind over a given amount  of  time? What kind 
of "discipline",  as Plato, as well as A. K. Sen, 6 put it, can be required. 
Traditional theories which uncompromisingly lay down some fixed 
vision of "The  G o o d " ,  be it Plato's or Bentham's vision, of course, don' t  
have this problem. Under such theories a legitimate change of mind about 
a specific set of alternatives would entail that the individual either had 
previously had the wrong fundamental value or the wrong factual infor- 
mation or, possibly, that the factual circumstances of  the decision had 
changed. 
This problem points to a kind of decision problem that is quite separate 
from the problems which have been the central concern of decision theory 
for centuries. From Bayes on, the complications of formally specifying 
what it means for an individual decision made at a specif ic t ime to be 
rational have been examined. From Condorcet on, the complications of 
formally specifying what it means for a social decision made on the basis 
of  rational individual preferences to be, itself, rational have been examin- 
ed. But the problem of  what it means, formally, for preference orderings 
collected over time from one individual to be rational over t ime given that 
each ordering was rational at a t ime has not been subjected to this kind 
of scrutiny. 
The pessimistic conclusion argued for below is that the search for a 
formal set of  constraints on rationality over time is hopeless for the 
preference utilitarian. Unfortunately for preference utilitarianism, the 
problem of specifying rationality-over-time constraints for preference 
orderings given by one individual at various times is open to a modifi- 
cation of the argument used by Kenneth Arrow to show the impossibility 
of specifying social rationality constraints for preference orderings given 
by various individuals at one time. What is worse is that some of the major 
problems with Arrows's Impossibility Theorem do not arise for the 
modification of his argument to be given here. 
Four basic elements are involved in rationality-over-time for the prefer- 
ence utilitarian. First, there are the various specific preference orderings 
that an individual would have at various times. Second, there will be the 
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TAL SCRIVEN 
relevant factual information which constrains the orderings. Third, also 
constraining the orderings will be whatever fundamental  values the-indi- 
vidual was trying to maximize at the various times. Finally, theories like 
preference utilitarianism must specify some set of  normative constraints 
either on the orderings or directly on the fundamental  values underlying 
the orderings which yield some intuitive boundaries for rationality-over- 
time. 7 There is, of  course, no point in looking for normative constraints 
on facts. Facts are the way they are whether they ought to be that way 
or not. For this reason, rationality-over-time is just not a problem for 
theories like Bentham's  because the only variable impinging on orderings 
over time is factual information which is not subject to normative 
constraint. 
As already indicated, coming up with a serious set of  normative 
constraints for rationality-over-time is not, even on the surface, going to 
be easy. Thus, pointing to the fact that none have been established 
wouldn ' t  be very interesting. My intention, however, is to prove that none 
can be established which would be compatible with preference utilitaria- 
nism. The strategy in proving this will parallel Arrow's  strategy in proving 
the impossibility of  social decision rationality constraints. A set of  very 
minimal constraints which the preference utilitarian would have to accept 
as the barest necessary conditions of  rationality-over-time will be shown 
to be jointly inconsistent. 
Some rephrasing of  the standard notation of decision theory is necessa- 
ry before proceeding to the proof.  Numeral  subscripts will represents 
times in the individual's life with 1 being the earliest time slice in his life, 
n being the latest and i, j and k being variables. The lower case letters 
x, y, z and w denote specific alternatives. P denotes the strong preference 
relation and so xP~y means the individual preferred x to y at time 1. R 
denotes the weak preference relation and so XRly means the individual 
preferred x at least/ts much as y at time 1. When xPy appears without 
a subscript it means the individual must (or is rationally required to) 
prefer x to y and, likewise, xRy means the individual must prefer x at least 
as much as y. The relation P is definable in terms of the relation R as 
follows: xPy if and only if xRy and yRx (i.e. not yRx). The relations R, 
P,,  R- and P are transitive, R and _P are reflexive, and P and R are 
irreflexive. R1, R2 and so on, when standing alone, will denote preference 
orderings of  the individual at times 1, 2, and so on. C(S) denotes the 
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P L A T O ' S  " D E M O C R A T I C  M A N "  
individual 's choice set f rom a set S of  alternatives, that is, the set of  
alternatives in S that the individual prefers at least as much as any other 
alternatives in S. C(s,R) denotes the individual's choice set f rom S given 
his preferences over time (R i . . . . .  Rj )  and C(S,R') denotes his choice set 
f rom S given his preferences over time (R} ..... R j). 
Major  assumptions upon which proof  depends are as follows: 
C O N D I T I O N  U (Unrestricted Domain): No logically possible configu- 
rations of  individual preference orderings given over time can be rejected 
unless they are a result of  factual misinformation or of  miscalculation, s 
C O N D I T I O N  P (Temporal Pareto Principle): For any pair of  alternatives 
x and y, if for every time i, xPiY then xPy. 
C O N D I T I O N  I (Independence o f  Irrelevant Alternatives): Let R and R' 
be the binary relations determined by a rational individual's preferences 
corresponding, respectively, to two sets of  the individual's preference 
orderings over time, (R1 ..... R j) and (R} ..... R)) for a set S of  alternatives. 
I f  for all pairs of  alternatives x and y in a subset S' of  S and any time 
k, XRkY if and only if XR'kY then C(S',R) and C(S',R') must be the same. 
C O N D I T I O N  D (Non-decisiveness o f  Single Orderings): There is no 
single preference ordering at any time i such that for every logically 
possible combination of preference orderings over time xPiy implies xPy. 
This statement of  the major  assumptions involved in the proof  of  the 
impossibility of  preference utilitarianism makes it clear yet again why 
theories like Bentham's  will not face a similar problem. The classical 
utilitarian, or anyone else whose theory imposes a fixed fundamental  
value, would clearly deny conditions U, P and D. U would be rejected 
since logical incoherence, factual misinformation and miscalculation are 
not the only reasons for rejecting preference orderings. They could also 
be rejected for being based on the wrong fundamental  values. P would 
be rejected for the same reason. The fact that an individual has always 
preferred x to y doesn ' t  mean he was ever right even if he was never 
factually misinformed and he never miscalculated. Similarly, D would be 
rejected by Bentham on the grounds that some single preference ordering 
'S CRATIC " 
l'  5
5  l  
5 l' 5
i,  ,   5 '
5 j,  , j
   
­
l 
. 8 
 
 Y  y
a  
l'  
i , l'
\> ,  j,  , j 5
Y 5 5  
x kY x ky 5
 5
  
t  
 
'
, t
   
,  
 .
t  
 l 
'
 .
    
 TAL SCRIVEN 
R i should be decisive if it was only at time i that the individual held the 
correct hedonistic fundamental  value. 
However,  given the background assumption that an individual's prefer- 
ence orderings over time are individually logically coherent and not based 
on misinformation or miscalculation, none of the above conditions can 
be rejected by the preference utilitarian. In fact, much more would be 
required in order for the preference utilitarian to give a reasonable 
account of  individual rationality. Unfortunately,  these minimal 
constraints are enough to show that the theory can ' t  possibly give even 
a minimally adequate account of  individual rationality over time. 
DEFINITION.  D v (x,y) if and only if xPvY implies xPy and y P  vx implies 
yPx,  where D v (x,y) means that the set Vof  preference orderings over time 
is decisive in determining whether the individual must (or is rationally 
required to) prefer x to y or y to x and xPvy  means that x is ranked over 
y in all of  the orderings in V. 
T H E O R E M .  Conditions U, P, I and D are jointly inconsistent given 
transitivity, irreflexivity and the assumption that the individual's prefer- 
ence orderings over time are individually non-contradictory. 
Proof. 9 (1) From Condition P it follows that for any pair of  alternatives 
x and y there exists a set of  personal preference orderings given over time 
which is decisive for Ix,yl (namely, the set of  all of  the individual's 
orderings over time). Thus, for any pair of  alternatives there is a minimal 
decisive subset of  this set of  all orderings which can be constructed by 
removing orderings one at a time until we reach a set which will not be 
decisive if any one more of its orderings is removed. Let V be such a 
minimal decisive set for Ix,Yl, Ri be a member  of  V and V be the set of  
all orderings not in V. In addition, suppose that no proper subset of  V 
is decisive for any pair of  alternatives. 
(2) Let z be a third alternative and the orderings for Ri,  V - R  i and V 
be as follows: 
R i V -  R i V 
x Z y 
y x z 
Z y x 
i   i 
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P L A T O ' S  " D E M O C R A T I C  M A N "   
(3) By definition, since Dv(x,y) and xPvy, xPy. 
(4) Since V - R  i is not decisive for any pair of alternatives and only 
orderings in V - R  i have z ranked over y, zPy. 
(5) By transitivity and irreflexivity, xPy and zPy imply xPz. 
(6) But R i is the only ordering which has x ranked over z, so DR i (x ,z) .  
(7) Since no proper subset of V is decisive for any pair of  alternatives 
a n d  DRi(x,z), it must be that V = R  i and thus, by hypothesis, DRi(x,y). 
(8) Having s h o w n  DR i (x,.v) and DR i(X,z) it can easily be shown that 
(a) DRi(w,z ) for any w4:z and (b) DRi(w,x) for any wg=x. 
(a) Suppose 
Ri Ri 
w Z 
x w 
Z x 
By condition P, wPx and since DRi(x,z) and x P i z ,  xPz. By transitivity, 
w P z .  So,  D R i ( w , z ) .  
(b) Suppose 
Ri Ri 
w Z 
Z x 
x w 
By condition P, zPx and s ince  DR i (w,z)  and WPiZ , wPZ. By transitivity, 
wPx. So DR i (w,x). Thus, some single preference ordering is decisive over 
every pair of  alternatives. Hence, conditions U, P, I and D are jointly 
inconsistent given transitivity, irreflexivity and the assumption that the 
individual's preference orderings over time are individually non-contra- 
dictory and not based on factual misinformation or miscalculation. 
One question arises immediately concerning the above proof  and it 
centers on the use of Condition D. This condition rules out the possibility 
of  an individual's last preference ordering, R,~, being decisive since it 
cannot be stipulated that i S n .  But why should a preference utilitarian 
accept this restriction? Why can't  we just take an individual's last 
preference ordering as his real preference ordering? We can't  do this 
because it would lead us directly to the problem of the "Democrat ic  
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TAL SCRIVEN 
Man" .  Nothing would prevent an individual from rearranging his fun- 
damental values every fifteen seconds since x P j  would always entail xPy 
as n moves through time. On the other hand if i--/=n then no change of 
mind is allowed at all. The individual must always hold R i and, thus, the 
theory simply contradicts its own central claim that there are many 
legitimate values that individuals may pursue. So, either preference 
utilitarianism allows for a radical change of mind every millisecond or 
it allows for no change of mind at all. There is nothing in between. 
Although the basic logic of  the above argument is the same as Arrow's,  
some of the standard objections against Arrow's  Theorem will not apply 
to my argument. One objection made by J. M. Buchanan lO and also by 
Kurt Baler concerns to the whole business of applying individual rational- 
ity constraints like transitivity to social decisions. Baler claims that the 
failure of transitivity of the social preference relation 
... would seem to be no more surprising or paradoxical than the fact that an equal division 
of voters on some issue should show itself in a "contradictory social decision". In such cases 
there is then no genuine (transitive) social will or preference, however genuine (transitive) 
the individual wills or preferences may be.l~ 
What makes the proposal that transitivity be dropped as a constraint on 
the social preference relation especially intriguing is A. K. Sen's work on 
social decision. In his Collective Choice and Social Welfare 12 he devotes 
considerable attention to the examination of  social decision procedures 
which yield intransitivities but, nevertheless, manage to map any logically 
possible combination of  individual orderings onto a social choice set 
without contradiction and within Arrow's  four social rationality 
constraints. 
However important all of  this may be concerning Arrow's  Theorem 
none of it causes any trouble for  the argument above. Nowhere does my 
argument involve any concept of  social rationality. The problem I 'm  
concerned with is the relationship between individual rationality at any 
given time and individual rationality over time, and it seems pretty safe 
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P L A T O ' S  " D E M O C R A T I C  M A N "  
to me to assume that transitivity is a legitimate rationality constraint in 
either case. 
Arrow's  formulat ion of the condition on social decisions which corre- 
sponds to the above Condition I has probably raised more objections than 
any other part  of  his proof .  I have argued myself 13 that, given the 
strategic factors involved when various individuals come together to work 
out social decisions, a basic intuition behind the independence of irrele- 
vant alternatives condition used by Arrow is dubious. The centrality of  
strategic considerations and their relationship to Arrow's  Condition I is 
made formally clear by what has come to be known as The Gibbard- 
Satterthwaite Theorem.14 What  Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown 
is that Arrow's  Condit ion I can be replaced by a condition that social 
decision mechanisms be non-manipulable or " s t ra tegy-proof"  and the 
same pessimistic theorem follows. 
The role of  strategic manipulat ion in social decisions is easy to see. 
Suppose we have three people A, B and C whose preferences over three 
alternatives x, y and z are representable as follows: 
A B C 
x Z y 
y x z 
z y x 
Suppose also that the social decision will be made by having two majori- 
tarian elections, the first one between x and y and the second between the 
winner of  the first election and z. If  each person honestly expresses his 
preferences then x will beat y and z will beat x and so z will be the winner. 
I f  A sees this coming and realizes there is no way his first choice, x, is 
going to be chosen he will see that by misrepresenting his preferences in 
the first election he can at least get his second choice, y, chosen rather 
than his last choice, z. So he votes for y in the first election, it beats x 
and in the second election it beats z and is thus the social choice. I f  B 
and C are as smart  as A they will start strategically manipulating their 
preferences also and the situation will be bogged down in preference 
misrepresentation. 
Arrow always realized that strategic factors could not be properly taken 
into account by the method involved in his proof.  15 Of  course, the 
problem for Arrow's  proof  is the adequacy of any approach to social 
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TAL SCRIVEN 
decision theory which methodologically rules out such factors. This 
problem is overcome by Gibbard and Satterthwaite inasmuch as they rule 
out strategic manipulation at the normative level rather than at the 
methodological one. Manipulability is directly stated as an undesirable 
property of  social decision mechanisms and non-manipulabili ty is shown 
to be inconsistent with other intuitive conditions on social decisions. At 
any rate, reservations about the Condition I used in my proof  which are 
based on strategic considerations don ' t  carry the same weight they do 
against Arrow's  Condition I. Again, the subject of  my theorem is individ- 
ual rationality, not social rationality. What sense, then, can be made of  
the possibility of  engaging in strategic manipulation of one's own 
preferences over time against each other? What  sense is there in misrepre- 
senting to yourself your own preference ordering on Monday so that it 
prevails over your own preferences on Tuesday and Wednesday? 
Preference utilitarianism has become one of  the most widely discussed 
variants of  utilitarianism in recent years. It has, in fact, found its way 
onto the standard list of  different utilitarian theories offered in standard 
undergraduate ethics textbooks. 16 There is good reason for this. Harsanyi 
and others have made the theory painstakingly rigorous. It has blended 
smoothly into a vision Harsanyi shares with many  theorists of  a "general  
theory of rational behavior"  that would encompass ethics, social decision 
theory and game theory. The principle of  consumer sovereignty mixes 
well with the general relativism of  the day while still leashing ethics to 
formal constraints that don ' t  allow just anything to pass as moral.  This 
principle also mixes well with the political liberalism with which most 
utilitarians have chosen to associate themselves. The value of  self-deter- 
mination of  ends at the individual and social level certainly ranks high 
for Mill. The theory also has interesting and distinct consequences when 
applied to practical moral  problems. ~7 
But there has always been reason to be suspicious as well. When applied 
to certain practical problems where its consequences are clearly distinct 
f rom those of  classical hedonistic utilitarianism it seems to say the wrong 
thing. 18 Furthermore,  it is not at all clear that the hedonism of  Bentham 
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PLATO'S "DEMOCRATIC MAN" 
and Mill implies anything like the paternalism Harsanyi associates with 
it. Mill, after all, went quite out of his way in On Liberty to develop 
classical utilitarian arguments directly against paternalism. As noted 
earlier on in this paper, it is not at all clear that preference utilitarianism 
really can avoid an unbridled relativism without a lot of question begging 
along the way. 
Finally, we have the problem Plato saw with theories that fail to enforce 
some clear vision of the Good upon individuals and societies. One might 
argue that this problem is too theoretical to be of serious consequence 
even in decision theory. The fact of the matter, it might be asserted, is 
that, by and large, individuals' values just aren't  as chaotic as Plato's 
anti-democratic rhetoric has it. If  they were, the suggestion that social 
decisions be based on them would never have been token seriously in the 
first place. On the face of it, however, there is something wrong with this 
objection. Would it lessen the importance of Arrow's  Theorem if it could 
be shown that, as a matter of fact, voting cycles don ' t  arise very often 
in the real world? After all, if such oddities did occur regularly, the 
suggestion that social decisions should be based on amalgamations of 
individual preferences would never have been taken seriously in the first 
place! 
In fact, theoretical problems like the one presented here are important 
when weighing theory against theory, especially when the problems arise 
for one theory (in this case, preference utilitarianism) and not for others 
(like classical hedonistic utilitarianism). And it is the contention of this 
paper that the problem of Plato's "Democratic Man"  is not only serious 
but unsolvable. 
NOTES 
* 1 would like to thank Stephen Ball and Charles Hagen for helpful discussion of the topics 
in this paper. 
J. Harsanyi, 'Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory', in Decision Theory and Social 
Ethics, eds. H. Gottinger and W. Leinfellner (Boston: D. Reidel, 1978), p. 5. Harsanyi, of 
course, is not the only defender of preference utilitarianism nor is his specific version of 
the theory the only one available. A good analysis of various theories that share the 
fundamental assumptions of preference utilitarianism is given by A. K. Sen in 'Well-being, 
Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984', The Journal of Philosophy (April 1985): 
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